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Abstract 
 
Loyalty, Disobedience, and the Myth of the Black Legend in the 
Philippines during the Seven Years War 
 
Kristie Patricia Flannery, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2013 
 
Supervisor:  Jorge Cañizares Esguerra 
 
This paper interrogates the nature of loyalty and disloyalty to Spain in the 
Philippines during the British occupation of Manila in 1762-1764. It examines the 
identity and motivations of the thousands of soldiers who joined Simón de Anda’s army 
that mobilized against the British invaders, as well the Indigenous people who rose up in 
rebellion in the provinces to the north of Manila during this period, in order to preserve 
Spanish colonial rule. It also considers the nature of infidelity to Spain in the occupied 
Philippines.  This paper argues that, in a large part due to the cohesiveness of Catholicism 
among converted Indians, the Spanish empire in the Philippines proved remarkably 
resilient under the pressure of invasion and occupation.  The Black Legend blinded the 
British to the complexities of the real balance of power in in Manila and the Philippines 
during the Seven Years War  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Manila And The Philippines In The Mid-Eighteenth Century 
Manila in the middle of the eighteenth century was a bustling, multi-ethnic port 
city that was at once the colonial capital of the Spanish Philippines and the principal 
entrepôt of the lucrative trade between the Spanish empire and China.  Manila’s diverse 
population included Spanish and American-born colonial officials and their families, 
friars who travelled to Manila from the Iberian Peninsula and Spain’s American colonies 
to save souls, and soldiers recruited from Spain and New Spain (present-day Mexico), 
many of whom were convicts.  European and American-born Spaniards were always a 
minority in Manila: a 1779 census reported that their numbers reached only 1580.1  In 
contrast, in 1762 approximately 7000 Chinese lived in the Parián, the Chinese quarter of 
Manila located outside of the walled Spanish enclave of Intramurous.2  
“Negros” or blacks were conspicuous residents of Manila.  This colonial 
classification encompassed a diverse body Africans and their descendants, as well as 
dark-skinned people indigenous to the Indian Continent, including Malabars and 
Bengalis.  Many blacks were enslaved.3  It is less well known that Armenian merchants 
and sailors who dominated the Madras-Manila trade were increasingly common in 
Manila as the eighteenth century progressed.4  English, Irish, and French middlemen also 
carved out livings in this Pacific port city, despite the fact that their presence in the 
Philippines violated imperial law.  
To date, historical and ethnographic studies of Indigenous people in the 
Philippines under Spanish rule have focused on rural areas beyond Manila, obscuring the 
                                                
1 Maria Fernanda Garcia de los Arcos, “Grupos Ethnicos y Clases Sociales en las Filipinas de Finales del 
Siglo XVIII,” Archipel 57 (1999): 66. 
2 Salvador P. Escoto, “Expulsion of the Chinese And Readmission To The Philippines: 1764-1779,” 
Philippine Studies 47, no. 1 (1999): 70. 
3 Déborah Oropeza Keresey, “La Esclavitud Asiática En El Virreinato De La Nueva España, 1565-1673,” 
Historia Mexicana 61, (2011): 23. 
4 Bhaswati Bhattacharya, “Making money at the blessed place of Manila: Armenians in the Madras–Manila 
Trade in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Global History 3, no. 1 (2008): 1-20.  
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fact that “Indios” or Indians inhabited the city and its hinterland.5  Indians worked as 
domestic servants in convents and the private homes of wealthy Manileños, and Indian 
tributary workers comprised the bulk of the labor force employed in the construction and 
refitting of the huge galleons in the naval yards at Cavite.  As in other colonial capitals in 
the Spanish Empire, mestizos, the racially mixed progeny of multi-ethnic Manila, 
comprised the majority this city’s urban population.  The 1779 census counted 14407 
“mestizos de Sangley” (those descended from Chinese and Indians) in the colonial 
capital, and 2628 “mestizos de Español” (the offspring of Indian and Spanish unions).6 
How did the colonial government assert authority over this diverse and largely 
transient urban population?  Spain’s grasp on the Philippines in the mid-eighteenth 
century seems all the more tenuous when we recognize that colonial government officials 
as well the Crown regarded the Chinese presence in the Manila as a serious threat to 
Spanish control of the city.7  Moreover, the military and spiritual conquest of the 
Philippines beyond Manila remained incomplete two centuries after the “Hispanization” 
of the Philippines commenced.  The reach of the imperial power beyond Manila was 
limited to a military network of twenty-seven presidios or forts scattered across the 
Philippines, and a religious network of evangelical missions overseen by the 
Augustinians, Dominicans, Franciscans and Jesuits, which extended unevenly across the 
archipelago.8  By the 1760s the Spanish had not succeeded in “reducing” all of the 
Indigenous people even in the large island of Luzon, where Manila was located.  The 
                                                
5 John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization Of The Philippines: Spanish Aims And Filipino Responses, 1565-
1700 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday 
forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985); James C. Scott, Domination and 
the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
6 Garcia de los Arcos, “Grupos Ethnicos,” 66. 
7 Juan Gil, Los Chinos En Manila, Siglos XVI Y XVII (Macau: Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau, 
2011); O.P Santamaria, “The Chinese Parian (El Parian de los Sangleyes)” in The Chinese in the 
Philippines, 1570-1770, edited by Alfonso Felix, Jr. (Manila: the Historial Conservation Society, 1966), 
67-118.  
8 Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines, 49-51. The Dominicans were responsible for converting the 
Chinese diaspora in Manila as well as Indigenous people in the Pangasinan and Cagayan provinces to 
Catholicism.  The Augustinians were concentrated in Pampanga and Ilocos.  The Franciscans dominated 
the Bikol-speaking Camarines.  A combination of Augustinians and Jesuits worked in the Bisayan Islands.  
In the eighteenth century the Jesuits established missions in the Sultanate of Sulu. 
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Igorots who inhabited the Gran Cordillera Central in northern Luzon remained defiantly 
pagan, and the majority of the “Moros” in Sulu Zone (in the very South of the Philippines 
archipelago) were unwilling to convert from Islam to Christianity.9  In spite of this, 
Spanish rule in the Philippines survived the Age of Revolution, which saw colonial 
polities in the Americas sever ties with the Empire, and endured until 1898.   
What constituted the foundation of fidelity to Spain in the Philippines, the colony 
that was separated by such extreme distances from centers of imperial power in New 
Spain and the Iberian Peninsula?  This paper makes a contribution to answering this 
important question by exploring the responses of the people living in the Philippines to 
the British invasion and occupation of Manila in 1762-1764.  It is prefaced on the 
assumption that examining a colonial city under the stress of an invasion reveals much 
about its social organization and the glue that holds that colonial society together. 
 
The British Invasion and Occupation of Manila, 1762-1764 
On 24 September 1762 a combined British Royal Navy and East India Company 
fleet of fifteen tall ships sailed into Manila Bay with the intention of seizing the city.  The 
appearance of the flotilla flying British colors caught Manileños by surprise; although 
Spain entered the Seven Years War against Britain in January of 1762, no one in the 
Philippines anticipated that Britain would attack ‘the Pearl of the Orient’.   
British warships pounded the fortified walls of Intramurous with heavy cannon 
shot for several days before a force of over 1700 fighting men disembarked from their 
vessels and marched on Manila.  The diverse British army incorporated 610 Sepoys, who 
were natives of the Indian Subcontinent employed as soldiers of the East India Company, 
as well as 314 prisoners of war, the majority of whom were French captives taken at 
Pondicherry.  It also comprised the Royal Navy’s 79th Regiment consisting of 567 men, 
many of whom would have been Englishmen and perhaps Americans pressed into 
                                                
9 William Henry Scott, The Discovery of the Igorots: Spanish Contacts with the Pagans of Northern Luzon 
(Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1974), 107-137; Nicholas Tarling, Sulu and Sabah: A Study of the 
British Policy Towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late Eighteenth Century (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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service, as well as two artillery units.  In addition to these fighting men, the Royal Navy 
and East India Company brought 100 Lascars to Manila.  The Lascars, also natives of the 
Indian Subcontinent, were expected to undertake “the labor of war”, which included 
transporting weapons, ammunitions and victuals from ship to shore to battle-field, 
digging trenches, and burying the dead.10 
When the British attack on Manila began, the Spanish defence force stationed in 
the colonial capital consisted of only 556 regular soldiers and eighty mestizo 
artillerymen.11  Within a week the Spanish colonial government succeeded in mobilising 
as many as 5000 Indians and mestizos from surrounding provinces to defend Manila.12  
Yet these reinforcements arrived in the capital too late to defend the city.  Manila fell to 
the British on 3 October 1762 after ten days of shelling and shooting and struggle.  On 
this date the Archbishop and interim Governor of Manila, Manuel Rojo del Rio y Vieyra, 
surrendered the city to the British.  The East India Company installed the Madras-born 
Briton Dawsonne Drake as the first British Governor of Manila.  Drake, along with four 
other East India Company officers, formed the Manila Council that ruled city for the 
duration of the British occupation of the city.  The Treaty of Paris that formally ended the 
Seven Years War returned Manila to the Spanish in 1764. 
But before Rojo surrendered to Manila to the British, Simón de Anda y Salazar, a 
junior oidor or judge of the Audiencia of Manila, declared himself Governor of the 
Philippines and promptly established an alternative colonial capital in the pueblo of 
Bulucan, 90 miles north of Manila.  From here the Governor-in-exile led a military 
campaign that attempted to destabilize the enemy’s grip on Manila.  Anda and his rebel 
army continued to engage the invaders in full-blown battles and smaller-scale clashes 
typical of guerrilla warfare until news of the peace treaty arrived in Manila.  Ultimately 
                                                
10 Nicholas Tracy, Manila Ransomed: The British Assault on Manila in the Seven Years War (Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press 1995),17; Elena Andrea Schneider, “The Occupation of Havana: War, Trade and 
Slavery in Eighteenth Century Cuba.” PhD diss., (Princeton University, 2011), 208-209. 
11 Salvador P. Escoto, “The Administration Of Simon De Anda Y Salazar, Governor-General Of The 
Philippines, 1770-1776” PhD diss. (Loyola University, 1973), 6. 
12 Shirley Fish, When Britain Ruled The Philippines 1762-1764 (Bloomington Indiana: 1st Books, 2003), 
122. 
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Anda’s resistance succeeded in prohibiting the expansion of the British stronghold 
beyond Intramuros and Cavite. 
Contemporary accounts of the British occupation of Manila indicate that between 
7000 and 10000 men fought in Anda’s army in 1762-1764.  Who were these men?  And 
why did they fight to restore Manila and the Philippines to Spanish control?  The answers 
to these questions are a lacuna in existing studies of the British occupation of Manila and 
the Seven Years War.  The historiography of the British occupation of Manila is divided 
into two distinct and conflicting interpretations of this historical event.  On the one hand, 
the Anglo historiography, decidedly oriented towards a popular rather than a scholarly 
audience, consistently understates the extent of resistance to the British invasion.  One 
historian remarked that Britain’s conquest of Manila “seemed to affirm Britain’s essential 
invincibility”.13  Instead of probing the problem of Anda’s army, the Anglo narrative 
emphasizes desertions from Spanish forces and the extent to which people in the 
Philippines were willing to cooperate with the British invaders.14  This version of events 
is undeniably stained by ‘the Black Legend’ that conceives of the Spanish Empire as 
particularly depraved, detested by imperial subjects, and in a long period of decline after 
1700.15  On the other hand, the Spanish historiography celebrates Simón de Anda’s 
heroic efforts, while denigrating both Archbishop Rojo, who is portrayed as a weak old 
man who folded easily before the British, and the Chinese, who are characterized as 
traitors to the King of Spain and the Catholic Church.16  Indigenous people are 
marginalized and their agency denied in both the Anglo and Spanish interpretations of the 
occupation.   
                                                
13 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Empire in British North America, 1754-
1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 516-517. 
14 Tracy, Manila Ransomed; Fish, When Britain Ruled the Philippines. 
15 Matthew Restall, “The Decline and Fall of the Spanish Empire Restall,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 64, no. 1, (2007): 183-194. 
16 Antonio Molina, Historia de Filipinas (Madrid : Ediciones Cultura Hispánica del Instituto de 
Cooperación Iberoamericana, 1984); Carlos Vila Miranda, “Toma de Manila Por Los Ingleses En 1762,” 
Anuario de Estudios Atlánticos 53 (2007): 167-220. 
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Manila has received little attention in broader studies of the Seven Years War.  
This is largely a consequence of this scholarship’s traditional focus upon the North 
American theatre of war, which in turn has resulted from conceiving of this conflict as a 
prelude to the American Revolution.17  The tendency to play down Spain’s involvement 
in this conflict has also shaped the literature’s neglect of Manila.  For example, in his 
recent study of the “Global Seven Years War”, Daniel Baugh described this a conflict 
between Great Britain and France, “the two most advanced monarchies of Europe.” 18    
The role of Indigenous people in the North American front of the Seven Years 
War has received significant attention from historians in recent years.  Thanks to the 
work of Fred Anderson, historians can appreciate why in 1760s “a man born a Catawba, 
reared as a Seneca, acting as a spokesman for the Iroquois Confederacy in the Ohio 
Country, chose to smash open the skull of a Frenchman.”19  We have a comparatively 
very limited understanding of why a Pampangan born in Bulucan marched to Manila and 
shot at Britons in red coats with his deadly bow and arrow, or why the mestizo born in 
Mexico, convicted of a petty crimes and sentenced to serve out an extended term of 
military service in the far-away Philippines, risked his life to preserve Spain’s Pacific 
Empire.  This paper aims to fill this knowledge gap.  In doing so we enrich our 
understanding of the history of the Philippines and the greater Spanish Empire, as well as 
the Seven Year War.    
This paper is divided into two parts.  Part One puts Anda’s rebel army under the 
microscope for the first time.  It demonstrates that a diverse array of people who 
converged in the Philippines during the Seven Years War joined the army of the 
Governor-in-exile and fought to return the Manila to Spanish rule, including significant 
numbers of European deserters from the British forces joined Anda’s army.  I argue that 
these soldiers were masterless men whom the Manila Council and Anda alike were 
obliged to bargain with in order to obtain their labor.  I then present evidence that 
                                                
17 Anderson, Crucible of War, 12. 
18 Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest 
(Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2011), 1. 
19 Anderson, Crucible of War, 12. 
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Mexican soldiers, who were mostly convicts, were also soldiers in Anda’s army, 
challenging the view that these men were inherently disobedient subjects.   
Indians formed the overwhelming majority of Anda’s army.  The final section of 
Part One explores the motivations behind Indian participation in the Spanish resistance.  
Many different Indigenous peoples populated the more than 7000 islands that comprised 
the Philippines archipelago in the mid eighteenth century.  The fact that six major 
languages were spoken in the Island of Luzon (Tagalog, Ilokos, Bikol, Pangasinan, 
Pampangan and Ibang) gives some indication of the diversity of Indigenous peoples who 
inhabited the region most affected by the Seven Years War.20  The majority of the 
indigenous people who fought in Anda’s army were Pampangans.  Tagalogs were also 
prominent in the resistance.  The evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that 
these Indians’ strong Catholic faith and relationships with regular clergyman who spoke 
their languages strongly influenced their loyalty to Spain throughout 1762-1764.  The 
Pampangans’ traditional role as allies of Spain and Indian Conquistadores, also premised 
on a shared Catholic faith, further reinforced their readiness to confront not only the 
British invaders, but also other Indigenous groups who rose in rebellion against the 
Spanish after Manila fell to the British.  
Part Two of this paper examines the actions of those imperial subjects who were 
disloyal to Spain during the British occupation.  This section begins by examining the 
armed indigenous uprisings led respectively by Diego Silang in the Ilocos province in the 
northwest of Luzon, and by Juan de la Cruz Palaris in Pangasinan province, situated 
immediately south of Ilocos.  I show that these mass anti-colonial rebellions were 
ultimately put down by axillary armies of loyal Pampangans, as well as local indigenous 
peoples mobilized by Augustinian and Dominican priests in the provinces where the 
rebellions occurred.  Therefore, rather than revealing the inherent weaknesses of Spanish 
colonial rule in the Philippines, the effective suppression of these rebellions attested to 
the resilience of the Spanish empire under attack from multiple enemies founded on 
Catholicism as a cohesive force. 
                                                
20 Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines, 17-18, 180. 
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The next section of Part Two briefly demonstrates that the Sultan of Sulu, who 
was being held captive in Manila when the British invaded the city, eagerly welcomed 
the British as liberators.  The response of the Sultan to the British invasion allowed the 
British to entertain fantasies of “annexation by consent” in Manila.  The British error was 
to assume that other colonized peoples were also exploited by the Spaniards and awaiting 
liberation as the Sultan of Sulu was.  The final section of Part Two examines the Chinese 
response to the occupation.  I argue that widespread Chinese collaboration with the 
British revealed the inability of missionaries to cement devotion in a population that did 
not buy into Catholicism.  Yet I also show that many Chinese exploited the British 
assumption of their infidelity to Spain to act as spies for Anda’s army, or to simply take 
advantage of the invasion to enrich themselves. Ultimately, the Black Legend blinded the 
British to the complexities of the real balance of power in Manila and the greater 
Philippines. 
The Black Legend is a strong theme in this paper.  I suggest that the Black 
Legend shaped the British strategy of invasion and occupation as well as subsequent 
interpretations of this historical episode.  Elena Andrea Schneider’s recent doctoral 
dissertation has demonstrated that the ideology of ‘empire by invitation’ influenced 
British strategy in the invasion and occupation of Havana, where the invaders anticipated 
that city’s large population of enslaved and free Africans and Afro-descendants would 
eagerly unite with British forces, guaranteeing a British victory.21  This ideology also 
infused the invasion of Manila.  British Royal Navy and East India Company assumed 
that Indians in the Philippines, oppressed as they were by Spanish colonial rule, would 
enthusiastically welcome the arrival of the invader-liberators.  Yet this romantic scenario 
did not come to pass either in the Caribbean or in the Pacific. 
This paper engages with various British and Spanish primary sources concerning 
the British occupation of Manila.  I draw heavily upon the records of the Manila 
Council’s meeting proceedings and various items of correspondence covering the period 
6 January to 29 December 1763 that are contained in two published volumes of the 
                                                
21 Schneider, The Occupation of Havana, 119. 
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Manila Consultations.22  I read the Manila Consultations both along the grain in order to 
understand the attitudes and experiences of the leaders of the occupying forces who 
produced this account, as well as against the grain to gain insight into the motivations of 
those loyal and disobedient subjects of the Spanish Crown who appear in the record as 
collaborators and enemies of the British.  It also refers to documents published in Volume 
49 of Blair and Robertson’s famous collection The Philippine Islands, as well as Eduardo 
Navarro’s annotated Documentos Indispensables Para La Verdadera Historia De 
Filipinas - the most important published collection of Spanish documents relating to the 
British occupation of Manila. 23  Finally, this paper utilizes recently digitized sources 
from the Filipinas section of the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, Spain.  All of the 
primary sources that informed this study are published in edited collections of 
documents, or are available in their complete, original form as digitized sources online.     
   
  
                                                
22 Records of Fort St. George. Manilha Consultations, 1763 Vol 5. Madras: Superintendent, Government 
Press, 1940); Records of Fort St. George Manilha Consultations, 1763 Vol 6. Madras: Superintendent, 
Government Press, 1940). 
23 Anon. “Documents For The History Of The Invasion And War With The English In Filipinas, 1762-
1764” in The Philippine Islands Vol. 49, ed. Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson 
(Cleveland, Ohio: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1908) 132-175; Agustín Maria; Castro y Amuedo, “Relación 
Sucinta, Clara Y Veridica De La Toma De Manila Por La Escuadra Inglesa, Escrita Por El P. Fr. Agustín 
Maria De Castro Y Amuedo, Natural De Villa De Bañeza, Agustino Calzado. Año De 1770,” in 
Documentos Indispensables Para La Verdadera Historica de Filipinas: 1762-1763, edited by P. Eduardo 
Navarro, (Madrid: Imprenta del Asilo del Huérfanos, 1908) 46-92. 
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Illustration One: Map of the Philippines24  
                                                
24 “Philippines map blank”, Wikimedia Commons, accessed on April 28 2013, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Philippines-map-blank.png.  
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PART ONE: FIDELITY  
Anda’s Multi-Ethnic Army 
The Anglo historiography of the British occupation of Manila has emphasized 
that desertion was a problem for both the invading British force as well as Anda’s rebel 
army.25  Under what conditions did soldiers desert?  Records of the Manila Consultations 
reveal that British and Spanish military leaders recognized the agency of fighting men 
and attempted to woo them over to their respective sides of the inter-imperial conflict.    
They British Royal Navy and East India Company could not assume the loyalty of the 
French prisoners of war, pressed Englishmen, Sepoys and Lascars they had enlisted. 
Naval and Company leaders agreed that offering financial rewards to the men in their 
service would help to prevent desertions.  In March 1763 the Manila Council increased 
the pay that “Soldiers, Sepoys and Lascars” received.  The Council also granted 
European soldiers a generous daily ration of alcohol, and the Sepoys and Lascars an 
additional dollar per month.26  Although it was common for soldiers serving in the 
Atlantic theatre of war to fight for years in arrears, the Manila Council went to great 
lengths to ensure that their fighting men were promptly paid their increased wages 
because “the consequence that may attend the non-payment of the troops may be very 
fatal.” 
British Captains feared that their forces would flock to Anda’s rebel army despite 
these pay increases.  On 25 May 1763, Lieutenant Captain Hancks sent an urgent 
message “to all the Gentlemen Officers Sergeants Corporals and Privates” at the Fort at 
Pasig, warning them of an impending attack by “500 good Spanish Soldiers with the 
French Company consisting of fifty Men, 6000 Pampangoes, and thirty Malabars, and six 
                                                
25 Tracy, Manila Ransomed; 15, 17, 32-38, 87-88. 
26 Manilha Consultations, 1763 Vol 5., 70-71, 74; 164-5. 
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pieces of Cannon.”27  Hancks was not as concerned about the sheer size of the 
approaching enemy army as he was about the possibility that soldiers in the British 
service would be tempted to defect to the Spanish resistance.  The Black Legend held no 
sway over the motley crew of fighting men who had been mobilized under the Union 
Jack in Manila.   
 “All the English Soldiers now in Pasig may depend on great Encouragement in 
the Spanish Service”, wrote Hancks.28  The Captain elaborated that Anda’s army was 
inviting enemy soldiers to defect and “deliver up the Garrison Guns [and] ammunition” 
to the resistance.  Those who did so were promised a monetary prize of “fifteen dollars as 
a present from the Governor”, to be paid “after the Garrison is delivered up to the 
Spaniards”.  The Spanish also guaranteed defectors would not be forcibly pressed into 
Anda’s army, as was the custom of war.  Defectors were promised to be given the choice 
of remaining in the Philippines and joining Anda’s army, for which they would be 
handsomely compensated with double the wages they received in the English Service, or 
going to “ New Spain or any other place that you think proper”.   
Such bargaining suggests that, to a considerable extent, the British occupation of 
Manila turned soldiers into masterless people.29  As the British and the Spanish were 
desperate for bodies, ordinary soldiers could determine the price at which they would sell 
their labor.  This view of soldiers was again demonstrated when the Manila Council 
offered a reward of 5000 dollars to any person who would capture and deliver up Simón 
de Anda to the British.30  In response, Anda offered an award of double the price on his 
head, or 10000 dollars, to anyone who would hand over, dead or alive, the British 
Governor of Manila or the members of the Manila Council.31  Although no person ever 
claimed these rewards, the fact that they were offered at all reveals that Simon de Anda 
                                                
27 “Manilha Consultations, 1763 Vol 5., 129-130. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Isaac Curtis “Masterless People: Maroons, Pirates and Commoners.” in The Caribbean: A History Of 
The Region And Its Peoples, eds. Stephan Palmié and Francisco A. Scarano (Chicago: Univeristy of 
Chicago Press, 2011): 149-162. 
30 Manilha Consultations, 1763 Vol 5, 15. 
31 Manilha Consultations, 1763 Vol 5,130-131. 
 13 
and the Manila Council perceived the soldiers from all nations who converged in Manila 
and its hinterland in 1762-1764 as men with whom they were obliged to negotiate.   
We do not know how many fighting men took the generous Spanish offer Captain 
Hancks described, but it is clear that many soldiers defected from British units to Anda’s 
forces during the period of Occupation.  French prisoners of war deserted from British 
ranks en masse as soon as Royal Navy and East India Company fleet arrived in Manila.32  
English soldiers also defected to Anda’s army.  Correspondence between the Governor of 
the Philippines and the Council of the Indies in Spain reveals that a unit of English 
soldiers who had joined Anda’s army during the occupation were posted in the Fort of 
Santiago in Manila in 1765, after the British Royal Navy and East India Company had 
withdrawn from the city.  We only know about these Englishmen because Spanish 
officers discovered the English artillery captain Mariano José Bustos Lent, had tried to 
rouse his countrymen to rebel and capture the Fort.  He had planned to shoot canon into 
the Royal Palace, the Cathedral, and the garrisons.  Before the mutiny could come to 
fruition, the Spanish General formed a council of war that convicted the would-be 
mutineers of being protestants, and sentenced them to perpetual banishment from “these 
dominions.”33   
Fighting men were not completely free.  Military discipline imposed a very real 
constraint upon soldiers’ agency throughout the Seven Years War, including in Manila.  
The Manila Council offered rewards of 200 dollars to soldiers and other persons who 
correctly identified “any person or persons… inciting men from their fidelity.”34  
Punishments for deserting were extreme during peacetime.  After 1740, men who 
deserted from the Spanish military in the Philippines and were subsequently caught were 
forced to endure the physical punishment known as “the running of the bats” six times 
                                                
32 Tracy, Manila Ransomed; 15, 17. 
33 AGI FILIPINAS, 335. L.17, The Real Cédula clearly identifies “Mariano José Bustos Lent” is being “de 
nación inglés, uno de los muchos desertores colocados de oficiales”.  It is possible that his name was 
Hispanicized in this document.  The Council of the Indies was furious that the Governor would be so 
irresponsible as to entrust the Fort of Santiago to foreigners, and for having punished them so leniently for 
a crime so grave.  
34 Manilha Consultations, 1763 Vol 5., 70-71. 
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(where the deserter ran naked through a tunnel of soldiers who beat him with “baquetas” 
or thin rods of iron or wood bearing metal tips as he passed), as well as four years in the 
galleys.35  Deserters from the British Royal Navy generally sentenced by courts martial to 
be whipped.36  
In wartime, the punishment for desertion was death.  In August 1763 Francisco de 
la Cruz, whom the British described as “a Malay”, was captured by the British and 
accused of encouraging two Sepoys to defect to Anda’s army.  De la Cruz had promised 
the Sepoys that if they went with him to Pampanga, they would give paid 1000 dollars, as 
well as allowance of 100 dollars per month.  In light of the “frequent Desertions, and the 
Town and Suburbs swarming with these Seducers”, the Manila Council determined that it 
was necessary to make an example of de la Cruz. 37  They sentenced him to be  
carried through the suburbs of Santa Cruz… causing his crime to be published at 
the Corner of every street, until he reaches Quiapo, and that he there be hanged 
within sight of the Post, to deter others from following his example.38     
Bim Naique Subadar, the Sepoy who testified against de la Cruz, was granted a 
reward of twenty-five dollars and “a handsome sword of the value of 100 dollars” for his 
loyalty to the British Crown and the East India Company.  Both of these prizes were 
“publically presented to the Subadar on the Parade, before all the troops in the Name of 
the Honourable Company, as a mark of their Approbation of his Conduct, and their 
confidence in his fidelity.”39  
Guatchinangoes were another group of fighting men who were represented in 
Anda’s rebel army.  “Guatchinangoes” was the Spanish term that British used to refer to 
mestizo soldiers from New Spain during the seven years war in Manila.  Several hundred 
of these soldiers would have been present in colonial capital and the wider Philippines in 
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when the British invaded Manila.  Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the colony relied on aid from the Viceroyalty of New Spain in the form of an annual 
allotment of silver and soldiers. 
 Recent studies by Stephanie Mawson and Eva Mehl have demonstrated that the 
majority of the soldiers who were sent to the Philippines from the Iberian Peninsula and 
America were forzados or convicts who had been sentenced to complete terms of penal 
servitude on the frontier of the Spanish Empire.40  Eighteenth century forzados had 
typically been convicted of property crimes, such as highway robbery, or were 
“vagabonds, idlers and other men of ‘evil dispositions’ who were deemed unsuitable for 
integration into society in New Spain”.41  Mawson and Mehl have emphasized the 
forzado system was essentially utilitarian program of “social cleansing” in New Spain, 
that simultaneously functioned to reform criminals, and supply the Philippines with 
much-needed supply of labor.  Mawson’s work has drawn attention to the problems 
inherent in employing criminals to regulate the social order in Manila.  She has argued 
that in the seventeenth century, forzados  
were engaged in an almost constant mutiny against the system that judicially 
relegated them to forced labor.  Return migration, violence, disobedience and 
mutiny were constant and persistent problems associated with every phase of the 
forzado system.42   
Neither Mawson nor Mehl have interrogated the actions and experiences of the 
forzados during the British occupation of Manila: the Seven Years War falls outside of 
the timeframe of their respective studies.  Nonetheless, their research would lead us to 
assume that these disorderly convicts who were known to desert ranks whenever an 
opportunity to do so arose would not have been enthusiastic recruits to Anda’s army.  
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Yet the Manila Consultations do not suggest that forzados or flocked to the 
British in significant numbers.43  On the contrary, this source presents compelling 
evidence that Spanish and Mexican forzados fought against the British in Anda’s army.  
“Guachinagoes” frequently appear on the Manila’s Council’s lists of prisoners of war 
taken in battle.  For example, in January 1763, the British captured “one Guachinangoe”, 
along with “one French deserter, one Spaniard… and Indians”.44  Captain Sleigh 
estimated that the enemy forces who defended his attack on the town of Matolos located 
forty kilometres north of Manila on 22 January 1763 numbered “400 men” and included 
“three Padres [Catholic priests], the Alcalde [local mayor], a great many Guachinangoes 
with an officer with them and two Frenchmen.”45    
It is fascinating that Admiral Cornish ordered “331 Guatchinangoe Prisoners” to 
be placed on board a East India Company ship and sent to Madras during the 
occupation.46  There is frustratingly little written about these prisoners in the Manila 
Consultations.  Several historians have remarked on this shipload of Mexicans who were 
transported to Madras, yet none have discovered their fate.  The only other large group 
that the British and East India Company transported from Manila to Madras were French 
deserters; the soldier-hungry British were forced to remove almost 200 French fighting 
men from the theatre of war after so many deserted to Anda’s rebel army.47  On this basis 
we might safely assume that the Mexican convict soldiers too were committed to fighting 
to preserve Spanish rule in the Philippines, and could not be persuaded to come over the 
British.    
This evidence challenges our assumptions about forzados; despite their “cultures 
of disobedience and criminality”, most of these men seemingly proved loyal in the face 
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of crisis.48  Why did the forzados support Anda’s campaign against the British?  It is 
possible that a common Catholic faith united these soldiers behind Anda in the face of a 
protestant enemy.  It is also likely forzados chose to fight with the Spanish as opposed to 
the British simply because waging war with Anda was more lucrative than waging war 
against him.  The Filipino galleon arrived in the Philippines from New Spain by mid-
1763.  The British failed to take this prize, and by mid 1763, Anda succeeded in 
smuggling all the Galleon’s silver to his military camp.  The possession of this treasure 
would have allowed Anda to generously remunerate his soldiers.49   
 
Faith and Fidelity    
Indians constituted the overwhelming majority of fighting men in Anda’s army.  
Members of the British Manila Council were initially convinced that they could persuade 
the Indians living in and around Manila that the new British colonial government was 
their friend.  The invaders believed that the Indians had suffered great abuses under 
Spanish rule, and would readily welcome the British as liberators.  One of the Council’s 
first moves was to prepare and distribute manifestos written in Spanish and Tagalog 
promising Indians who swore alliance to King George III that they would “be treated in 
every respect as his Britannic Majesty’s Subjects”, and freed from servitude and the 
burden of tribute which the Spanish government had imposed.  The Council also assured 
the Indians that they would be permitted to continue to live as Catholics as they had done 
under Spanish rule.50   
Yet such olive branches generally failed to achieve the desired results.  The 
introduction to this paper indicated that the actions of Indians in and around Manila 
disrupted the romantic Anglo conception of empire by invitation in the very early stages 
of the occupation, when Indian soldiers were mobilized in the thousands to defend 
                                                
48 Stephanie Mawson, “Unruly Plebeians and the Forzado System”, 5. 
49 Manilha Consultations, 1763 Vol 6, 79; Fr. José Victoria and Fr. Manuel Rebollo, “Documento Inédito,” 
in Documentos Indispensables Para La Verdadera Historica de Filipinas: 1762-1763, edited by P. Eduardo 
Navarro (Madrid: Imprenta del Asilo del Huérfanos, 1908), 31. 
50Manilha Consultations, 1763, Vol 5, 9. 
 18 
Manila against the initial British siege of the city.  Thousands of Indigenous fighting men 
continued to resist the British occupation after the city had fallen.  In January 1763 the 
British Engineer William Stevenson insisted that troops serving in the British and East 
India Company service required protection from the “treachery of the Indian Inhabitants 
who are very numerous… their fidelity [can]not much to be depended on.”51  
Why were so many Indigenous people willing to fight for Spain?  Evidence from 
British and Spanish sources strongly suggests that Indians’ Catholic faith and 
relationships with the regular clergy proved a solid foundation of their fidelity to Spain.  
Simón de Anda strongly believed that the colony’s priests possessed the power to 
persuade their flocks to fight the protestant invaders.  In a letter to Archbishop Rojo dated 
8 October 1763, the Governor-in-exile stated that “the natives venerate their parish 
priests, ministers, and missionaries” with “respect and love”.  Anda argued that the 
Indians’ devotion to the colony’s religious leaders, combined with the religious leaders’ 
“greater knowledge of the nature, customs, and civilization of the natives, can maintain 
them and incite them to the defense of the country against the English Enemy.”52      
The Manila Consultations demonstrate that many priests did just as Anda 
expected them; friars dissuaded their Indigenous flocks from assisting the British cause in 
any way, and actively encouraged them to participate the Spanish resistance.  
Significantly, the majority of the regular clergy could communicate with the Indians in 
their native languages.  Since 1603 every missionary in the Philippines were required to 
“know the language of the indios whom he should instruct”.53  Fluency in indigenous 
languages made it easier for priests to convince Indigenous people to fight for Anda.   
In May 1763 Backhouse arrested several priests whom he and his men had caught 
red-handed supporting Anda’s rebel army.  Backhouse informed the Manila Council that 
he was initially persuaded by Padre Montero’s apparent readiness to cooperate with the 
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British when they marched into Lipa, the pueblo where Montero was Prior in the south of 
Luzon.  The Priest “made a show of service, by promises and some other appearances.”54  
Yet Backhouse soon learned that Padre Montero was a “false trumpet.”  Montero 
enthusiastically discouraged his parishioners from providing the British with intelligence 
that would aid their war with Anda, had had allegedly threatened to cut out the tongues of 
traitors.  Montero also had gunpowder concealed in a chest in the convent where he 
resided, which Backhouse assumed was to supply the resistance.  In December British 
forces arrested Padre Esteban for “endeavoring to seduce a man to desertion”.55  The 
Council decided to spare the priest’s life to avoid “greatly irritating the minds of the 
people”.  The death penalty – the standard punishment for this offense, was “mitigated to 
a fine of forty dollars and six months imprisonment.”56  
Significantly, these Priests were not only whispering words of encouragement 
into their parishioners’ ears.  Regular clergymen, particularly the Augustinians and 
Dominicans, promoted the active participation of Indians in the resistance by actively 
participating Anda themselves.  Dominican friars took up shovels and to dig trenches 
around Anda’s stronghold in Bulucan.57  Padre Juan de la Conception acted as a courier 
on behalf of Anda, transporting peace treaties between the rebel army leader and the 
Manila Council.58  Augustinians transported rifles and lead to make bullets to the rebel 
army.59  The Manila Council observed that “The Augustine Friars” had even “appeared in 
Arms, contrary to their ecclesiastical functions thereby occasioning the effusion of much 
Human Blood.”60 Surely Catholic Indians were more willing to fight with Anda when 
they could do so alongside their priests. 
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The British Royal Navy and the East India Company recognized the role the 
influence that the clergy had over the Indians in Anda’s army.  In January 1763 the 
British Admiral Cornish informed the Manila Council that “the Friars take every occasion 
to increase the trouble against us”.  To limit the problems this section of Manila society 
could cause the British, he proposed that “the Clergy (the secular excepted) should 
secured and embarked on board the Squadron”; i.e. the Royal Navy ship that served as a 
floating prison during the occupation.61  Captain Thomas Backhouse concurred; he told 
the Council that the religious leaders “are the most Diabolical Enemies in the Country, 
Tyrants and Devils that stick at no length of wickedness cruelty and oppression.”62  Such 
vitriolic hatred of the colony’s religious leaders developed in response to evidence of 
these men’s very active support of the resistance.   
British attacks on churches and convents may have also swayed the decision of 
many devout Indians to fight with Anda against the British. In January 1763, the Manila 
Council ordered Captain Jeremiah Sleigh to prevent his men from “despoiling the 
churches of any of their images, ornaments, or sacred vessels”.  They reasoned that 
removing these objects “might be looked upon as a violation of the Articles of the 
Capitulation and greatly irritate the Inhabitants against us.”63  Yet inventories of the 
goods that soldiers appropriated from churches and convents reveal that such orders were 
ignored. The Council’s aims of nurturing friendly relations with the Indians 
fundamentally contradicted the private objectives of the fighting men enlisted in their 
service who strove to seize prizes and enrich themselves.  The “Inventory of Treasure and 
Other Articles in the Padres House or Convent of Tagey Taken By Captains Backhouse, 
Mure, and Lieutenant Lloyd” compiled in December 1763 demonstrates that British 
officers regarded the contents of religious buildings as fair spoils of war.64  This list 
suggests that the invaders stole all of the silver and gold that they could find from this 
Augustinian Convent.  In addition to large sums of money (a total of 931 dollars and four 
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reals) and “thirteen small bits of gold coin”, the invaders stole “one pair of shoe and knee 
buckles”, as well as finger rings and rosary beads.  They also removed objects used in the 
celebration of the Catholic mass, including “two silver crosses”, “two chalices”, and “a 
small bell”.  
The sacking of a church in the pueblo of Guadalupe provides insight into the 
religiosity of many indigenous people in the occupied Philippines, and the extent to 
which the British sacking of their churches impacted upon this community.  After 
Captain Backhouse and his men appropriated “One Malay virgin and black Jesus” from 
the Augustinian Convent at the Guadalupe, the Manila Council insisted that this icon be 
given back.65  This devotional image must have been revered by the local community, as 
Backhouse reported that the people of Guadalupe welcomed its return with an elaborate 
celebration.  He wrote that “In the Evening of the 28th [of March]… the Virgin Mary of 
Guadeloupe was carried away in great state and procession, she was accompanied by a 
thousand people at least in canoes and boats finely decorated”.  Backhouse himself 
“accompanied our Holy Mother till I saw her safe Lodged in the Church without Arms or 
attendance”; he was confident that the ceremonial return of the virgin “had good effect, & 
numbers of the Malays men women came to Pasig the same night to return thanks for the 
Honor I had done and the Confidence I had placed in them.”66  
Churches and convents were not the only buildings to be pillaged and destroyed 
by the invaders.  The British also stole and damaged the private property that belonged to 
Indigenous families and communities, which may have also motivated to support Anda’s 
army.  The Manila Consultations show that British forces frequently stole cattle from 
Indian villages.67  Furthermore, the British pursued something of a scorched earth policy 
in the smaller towns and agricultural region surrounding Manila, burning villages to the 
ground to eliminate places where the enemy could hide or congregate.  Even those 
villagers who pledged allegiance to the British were not protected from such attacks. 
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Captain Backhouse complained to the Council of Manila when the village of Guadeloupe 
was pillaged and burned, despite the fact that its inhabitants had “acknowledged 
themselves subjects to the King of Great Britain” and presented no threat to the British 
occupation.  Backhouse pointed out that the villagers were unarmed, and their “Bamboo 
Houses… are no Places of defense and of course cannot be any ways detrimental to” the 
British invasion.68  As Backhouse quite poetically observed, “War in her mildest dress is 
too severe where the innocent fall in her way”.  The Manila Consultations suggest that 
British violence against Indians was the norm, rather than an anomaly, in 1762-1764.  
Surely this contributed to the willingness of Indians to cooperate with the Spanish to 
defeat the British. 
 
Indian Conquistadors  
Comprehending the response of Indians to the British occupation requires 
recognizing that Indians were not a homogenous group in the Philippines.  Distinguishing 
groups of loyal Indians enhances our understanding of their fidelity to Spain under the 
pressure of occupation.  It was the Pampangans who proved to be the Spanish empire’s 
staunchest allies during the British occupation of Manila.  In 1762 Anda elected to 
establish is government in exile at the Pampangan pueblo of Bulacan because of its 
people’s loyalty to the Spanish crown.69  In 1765 the King of Spain issued a Real Cédula 
that acknowledged the “outstanding services of the Indians of the Pampanga Province” 
during the British invasion of Manila.70  It emphasized the decisive role three 
Pampangans had played in military confrontations with the British “while all the officers 
of the Plaza, the Regiment of Infantry, and the Principal Artillery unit were left prisoners 
of war.”  In recognition of “the valor with which they confronted the enemy, and the 
gusto with which not a few of them scarified their lives”, the Real Cédula granted village 
status and a coat of arms to the pueblo of Bacolor, thirty-five miles north of Manila, and 
made this town the capital of the province of Pampanga. 
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The Pampangans not only mobilized against the British in 1762-1764.  During 
this period they also supported the Spanish crown to put down the large Indigenous 
uprisings that emerged in other Provinces after Manila had fallen.  While these rebellions 
will be discussed in more depth below, it is noteworthy that the Pampangan soldier 
Miguel Bicus killed David Silang, the leader of the Indigenous rebellion in the Ilocos 
Province.  Subsequently the King of Spain decreed that Bicus and his sons would be free 
from the obligation of tribute.  The rewards that the monarch granted to his loyal vassals 
in the aftermath of the British occupation of the Manila brings to light the networks of 
patronage that made the Spanish Empire in the Philippines resilient while under attack.  
However, if we dig deeper into the historical record before 1762, we see that the Spanish-
Pampangan alliance was long-standing arrangement.71 
The Pamangan-Spanish alliance dates back to at least 1594 when the Pampangans 
helped the Spanish to defend Manila from the attack of the Chinese pirate Limahong.72.73  
Pampangans consolidated their status as Indian Conquistadors in the late seventeenth 
century.  In the 1680s, Pampangans were deployed alongside soldiers from the Iberian 
peninsular and New Spain in the formal ‘reduction’ of the Marianas, and particularly 
Guam, the largest island in this group.  Many of the Pampangans who accompanied 
Spanish forces to this chain of volcanic islands on the galleon route between Manila and 
New Spain were accompanied by their families, as Pampangans were intended to be 
model Indians that newly colonized religious people were supposed to mimic.74  
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In the first half of the eighteenth century Pampangans also collaborated with the 
Spanish to suppress indigenous uprisings that periodically broke out closer to Manila.  
For example, in 1721, The Archbishop of Manila and interim governor of Manila 
Francisco de la Cuesta informed the Council of the Indies that Pampangan soldiers were 
deployed alongside Spanish troops to put down uprisings in four Indian pueblos.75  By 
1739 Pampangan soldiers were fully integrated into the Pacific presidio network.  At 
some Presidios, Pampangans accounted for fifty per cent or more of all soldiers deployed 
there; the Cuyo Fort in the Calamianes islands, which served to defend against the attacks 
of Islamic Moro pirates, as well as the fort of San Francisco Javier in Yligan, were 
manned entirely by Pampangans.76  It is true that the Philippines was chronically lacking 
in soldiers from Spain and New Spain throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  Nonetheless, these statistics demonstrate that military leaders placed a great 
deal of faith in their Indian allies, entrusting them with forts and cannons; the core 
components of Spain’s system of imperial defense in the archipelago. 
What was the foundation of this longstanding alliance between the Pampangans 
and the Spanish?  John Leddy Phelan has argued that in the seventeenth century, this 
coalition was a rational response to the geopolitical environment the Pampangans and 
Spanish inhabited; the Pampangans benefited from the protection Spaniards provided 
against the “fierce sambals who periodically terrorized the fertile valley” in the first half 
of the seventeenth century.”77  While not ruling out the strategic military benefits of this 
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alliance, I suggest that the Pampangan-Spanish alliance was also based on a common 
Catholic faith.  The Pampangans were the among the first Indigenous converts to 
Catholicism in the Philippines.  In the eighteenth century Pampangans trained as priests 
in the Seminary of St Clement.  In 1903 Pampanga had more churches than any other 
province in the Philippines.78 The reduction of the Marianas was a spiritual as much as a 
military conquest, and it is probable that the Indian conquistadors who participated in this 
campaign were inspired by a religious mission to convert pagans to Catholicism.79  It is 
possible that the Pampangans who fought in Anda’s rebel army were convinced of the 
merits of the mission to eradicate Protestants from their homeland.   
The role that the Pampangans played as Indian Conquistadores was not unusual in 
the Spanish Empire, although it has not been widely recognized in histories of the British 
Occupation of Manila or histories of the Spanish Empire.  Recent studies of Indian 
Conquistadors have drawn our attention to the role that Spain’s indigenous allies played 
in the conquest of the New World.  Reflecting trends in the historiography of the Spanish 
Empire more broadly, this scholarship has so far focused on the conquest of the 
viceroyalty of New Spain and Central America in the sixteenth and early seventeen 
centuries.  The Philippines have not been completely excluded from these studies; Yanna 
Yannakakis, as well as Michel Oudika and Matthew Restall, have shown that Tlaxcalans 
travelled to the Philippines as soldiers and model Indians in the early seventeenth 
century.80  The role of Indian allies indigenous to the Philippines playing the role of 
Indian conquistadors has previously been excluded from this literature.    
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PART TWO: DISOBEDIENCE   
Disloyal Indians 
 The Manila Council believed that Indigenous people were throwing off “the 
Spanish yoke” when two large-scale Indian rebellions broke out in the island of Luzon in 
late 1762.  Diego Silang led an armed uprising in the Ilocos province in the northwest of 
Luzon.  Juan de la Cruz Palaris headed the revolt in Pangasinan province, situated 
immediately south of Ilocos.  These rebellions were not minority movements.  Thousands 
of indigenous people mobilized behind Silang and Palaris between 1762 and 1764.  
These rebellions were fundamentally anti-colonial in character.  Fernando Palanco 
has demonstrated that, from the outset, the Silang rebellion primarily aimed to free 
Ilocanos from tribute and personal service.  These were the first demands Silang asserted 
when he appeared on 14 December 1762 with a mob of 2000 armed Indians at the 
residence of the Spanish Alcalde in Vigan, the capital of the Ilocos Province.  Silang and 
his supporters also demanded the removal of the Alcalde from office.81  In attacking 
tribute and forced labor, those who rose up in rebellion were attacking the very 
foundation of the relationship between the Spanish Crown and indigenous imperial 
subjects in the Philippines.  They also rejected the authority of the Alcalde who 
represented the power of the Governor of the Philippines in his jurisdiction.  
David Routledge has shown that the Silang rebellion was also committed to 
removing the existing Principalia or class of ruling indigenous and mestizo elites in 
Ilocos from power.  Routledge argues that this was part of the rebellion’s anti-colonial 
agenda.  Silang’s attack on the Principalia constituted an attack on the Spanish colonial 
regime in the Philippines, as the hierarchical organization of the Republic of Indians in 
was an integral part the colonial social order.82  This Indigenous ruling class facilitated 
the exploitation of Indians; the responsibilities of hereditary and Spanish-appointed 
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community and city leaders included collecting tribute from Indians, which they and their 
sons were not obliged to pay, and organizing gangs of Indians to undertake forced labor 
when this was requested by the Crown, from which the Principalia were also exempt.  In 
contesting the legitimacy and authority of this group, the Silang rebellions contested the 
structure of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines.83  
The Palaris rebellion began in the town of Binalatongan pueblo in the Pangasinan 
province also in late 1762 when the Indians resident here refused to pay the annual tribute 
and demanded earlier tribute payments be reimbursed.  Local priests initially agreed that 
they payment of tribute could be suspended while the British occupied Manila, however 
the leader of the rebellion Palaris then demanded that all Spaniards abandon the Province, 
including Spanish priests.  Most missionaries were subsequently forced to flee the 
province after the rebels set fire to churches and convents.84  The objective of ridding 
Pangasinan of all Spaniards and the clergy renders this uprising explicitly anti-colonial.  
From Binlatongan the Palaris rebellion spread to many pueblos and cities in Pangasinan.  
At its peak in December 1763, a mob of 10,000 Indians assembled in San Carlos and 
insisted their demands be met.  The mob set fire to the Dominican church and convent 
here, underscoring the anti-clergy agenda of the rebellion.85 
 What role did the British play in these rebellions?  Diego Silang manipulated 
inter-imperial rivalries to further the interests of the Ilocanos he represented.  In 1763 
Silang wrote to Anda, declaring that his objective of removing the corrupt Principalia 
from power did not undermine his loyalty to the crown, and his commitment to defeat the 
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British.86  He simultaneously pursued an alliance with the British Manila Council.87  In 
May 1763 Silang wrote to a letter to the invaders in which he recognized King George III 
“as my king and master” on the premise that Illocanos would be released from tribute, 
and allowed to continue to practice their religion.  Silang was a shrewd negotiator.  His 
letter to the Manila Council was accompanied by a gift of “twelve loaves of sugar, twelve 
baskets of Calamy, and 200 cakes or balls of Chocolate”, which demonstrated the 
genuineness of the rebel’s promises and the tangible benefits that would accrue to the 
British from an Illocano alliance.88  Silang pointed out that “paddy, wheat, cattle, good 
coco, wine, sugar, onions, garlic, fowl, horses, cotton, [and] a kind of liquor called 
bassia…and other useful effects” were plentiful in his province, inferring these could be 
traded for weapons and manpower.  
It is significant that Silang’s negotiation strategy included flattering the British 
notion of empire by invitation.  He sang the song the invaders wanted to hear about the 
“poor Indians…. who continually suffer from the Spaniards’ Damages, losses and 
affronts.”89  This reveals that the British discourse of the black legend was disseminated 
throughout the Philippines during the occupation of Manila, and readily appropriated by 
indigenous peoples to further their own ends.   
The British promptly accepted Silang’s offer.  This delivered allies in the north of 
the country, much needed victuals, as well as the possibility of raiding Augustinian 
convents in Illocos.  Soon after receiving Silang’s letter and gift, the Manila Council 
dispatched a detachment of twenty Europeans and thirty Seapoys with arms and 
ammunition to Illocos under the command of lieutenant Russell to support Silang against 
Anda’s troops who had been mobilized to put down the rebellion.90    
There is no evidence that the Palaris or other leaders of the Pangasinan rebellion 
ever reached out to the British as Silang did, although the British certainly attempted to 
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forge an alliance with the Pangasinans.  When the Manila Council “received advice that 
the Province of Pangasinan had revolted from Senor Anda” in March 1763, it promptly 
resolved to dispatch  
a letter to the Governor and Chiefs of the province, offering them our Friendship 
and Protection, promising to assist them as much as in our Power and to secure 
them the free exercise of their religion with an open commerce.91  
In the absence of a response, another letter was issued to Pangasinan leaders in May 
1763.  The British proposed,  
If you will continue to oppose these evil Designs of the Malecontents we will 
enter into an Alliance with you and when our ships which are shortly expected 
arrive we will send you such an assistance as with toops of your Province and 
IIIocos will enable us (with Gods Blessing) to crush Mr. Anda and his faction. 
You shall enjoy every liberty you can hope or expect.92   
We do not know if any leaders of the uprising in Pangasinan ever received this 
correspondence.  If the disloyal Indians did receive petitions from the English, it seems 
they chose to ignore them.  The thousands of tributaries who rose up against the Spanish 
in Pangasianan were not desirous of liberation by the British.   
It may come as no surprise to readers that the regular clergy did not support these 
anti-colonial rebellions.  But what is important is that the clergy played a decisive role in 
their suppression.  Silang remarked that the Augustinians “have pursued us as if we were 
wild boars, [and] neither has our submission, nor laying down our arms and crying for 
mercy availed us in the least for a further security.”93  When the Pampangan Pedro 
Becbec slay Silang sometime in early June of 1763, he did so with the blessing of the 
Bishop Fray Bernado de Ustáriz. After the rebellion in Illocos did not end with Silang’s 
death, the Augustinians raised an army of Indigenous soldiers estimated to have been 
between 8000 and 9000 strong that continued to engage in battles and skirmishes against 
the rebels led by Gabriela Estrada, Silang’s widow.  The rebellion was finally put down 
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when Estrada was captured and hanged alongside more than ninety rebels in late 
September 1763.94 
Similarly the Dominicans were crucial in putting down the Palaris uprising.  In 
February 1763, Fray Pedro Ire attempted to mediate a general pardon of the Pangasinan 
rebels on Anda’s behalf.  He urged the Pangasinans to be obedient and loyal to royal 
authority, because “God commands it”.95  Fray Andrés Meléndez, the priest at Lingayen, 
the capital of Pangasinan, refused to minister to his parish until they agreed to accept a 
Spanish Alcalde and put an end to their support for Palaris.  The Dominicans also took it 
upon themselves to gather 4000 pledges from Indians in Pangasinan to fight with Anda’s 
forces against the rebels once the former entered the province.96  The Dominicans 
contributed to the erosion of support for Palaris’ rebellion which effectively ended in 
early 1764, long before Palaris was finally captured and executed in 1765.   
It is tempting to read the Silang and Palaris rebellion as symptoms of a weakened 
Spanish empire, and the tenuous grip that Spain held over its Pacific poessions.  These 
rebellions were undoubtedly anti-colonial in their objectives.  Yet an appreciation of the 
way in which the regular clergy and flocks of loyal Indians organized to suffocate these 
challenges to Spanish rule ultimately demonstrated the strength and durability of this 
institution. 
 
Throwing off the Spanish Yoke 
 If there was one person who truly welcomed the British into Manila as liberators 
it was the Sultan of Sulu and Sabah A’zim-ud-Din, who exemplified the perfect victim of 
cruel, Spanish imperialism that informed the British invasion and occupation of Manila.  
The Sultan and his son Mohammed Israel were being held prisoners of the Spanish in 
Manila when the city fell to the British, and they eagerly welcomed the British as 
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liberators.  The British Naval Officer Alexander Dalrymple declared that these men, 
“tired of Spanish Control, threw of their yoke, and put themselves under our 
Protection.”97   
Friendly relations between the Sultan and the British had been in the making for 
some time before the occupation began.  While in captivity in Manila, the Sultan 
managed to maintain correspondence with the Sulu Sultanate and British agents.  In 
November 1761 the Sultan even signed a trade treaty with his brother, the Sultan 
Bantilan, and the East India Company.   
During the British occupation of Manila, A’zim-ud-Din and his son entered into a 
mutual defence and trade treaty with the East India Company.  The treaty granted the 
Company the right to “erect Forts or Factories” in Jolo, the capital of the Sulu province, 
and its dependent territories.98  The Company soon escorted the Sultan and Mohammed 
Israel to Jolo as they had requested.  To kick-start a healthy trading relationship between 
the two parties, the Company also “advanced to Prince Israel the sum of 1,000 Dollars” 
that he was to repay “in the goods of his Country”.  Although it falls outside of the 
parameters of this study, it is noteworthy that the Sultan’s relationship with the British 
continued through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.99  
 
The Chinese  
What role did the Chinese play in the British occupation of Manila?  In the 
aftermath of the occupation, all Chinese were condemned for collaborating with the 
British.  In June 1764 Simon de Anda wrote a letter to King Charles III that accused the 
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Chinese of being traitors as well as godless heathens, and recommended that all Chinese 
be expelled from the Philippines.  The King accepted Anda’s advice and decreed the 
expulsion of the Chinese on 17 April 1766.  It took until June the following year for the 
decree to arrive in Manila.  In addition to the 3000 or more Chinese who fled Manila 
before expulsion was officially decreed, 2460 Chinese were forcibly removed from the 
Philippines between 1767 and 1772.100   
Informed by Anda’s analysis of the events of 1762-1764, the Anglo and Spanish 
historiographies of the British occupation of Manila have argued that the Chinese eagerly 
supported the British invasion from its earliest stages until the last ship sailing a union 
jack sailed out of the Bay of Cavite.  The ‘Chinese as traitors’ narrative was consolidated 
in these historiographical traditions by the beginning of the nineteenth century.  The 
Augustinian priest and historian Joaquín Martínez de Zúñiga wrote in his 1803 Historia 
De Las Islas Philipinas that “from the moment [the British] took possession of Manila, 
these Chinese gave them every aid and accompanied them in all their expeditions.”101  
Fish uncritically reproduced Zúñiga’s analysis of the role of the Chinese in the British 
occupation of Manila in her 2003 study of this event.102  The reality was far more 
complex than this.  
To be sure, there were many Chinese who aided the British in significant ways. 
The Manila Consultations leave no doubt that large numbers of Chinese collaborated with 
the British Navy and the East India Company.  Letters from British Army captains 
indicate that Chinese soldiers were quickly integrated into the multi-ethnic units 
mobilized to fight against Anda’s rebel army.  In April 1763 the British Captain Richard 
Bishop reported that he employed fifty armed Chinese as sentinels in the fort of Cavite.103  
Between 1500 and 2000 Chinese joined the estimated 400 European and 300 “black 
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Malabar” soldiers who attacked Anda’s army at Bulucan.104  In addition to serving as 
soldiers, Chinese aided the British as local guides and spies.  Expert mariners made it 
possible for the invaders to navigate the rivers, estuaries and coastline of the Philippines; 
Captain Backhouse had a Chinese pilot “who behaved like an angel.”105 Chinese guides 
also helped the invaders traverse overland routes.  Agustín Maria de Castro claimed that 
the spies who assisted the British army to discover Anda’s outpost at Bulucan “were all 
Chinese or mestizos, traitors to the motherland.106   
Not only did some Chinese serve as important facilitators for the invasion, several 
non-Chinese helped the invaders’ cause by serving as go-betweens for the Chinese and 
British.  Despite the importance of these intermediaries, they have been overlooked in the 
existing historiography. Diego or James O’Kennedy was the most prominent of these 
intermediaries.  
 Originally from Ireland, Diego O’Kennedy had been in Manila since at least 
1756.107  By 1761 the foreigner married Doña Maria Cayetana Esguerra, the daughter of 
an elite and land-rich Manileño family.108  But neither his Catholic faith nor family ties 
assured O’Kennedy’s loyalty to Spain.  O’Kennedy was one of the first people to declare 
himself a “obedient humble servant” of the British Manila Council.  The Manila 
Consultations reveal that the Irishman strongly influenced the British decision to 
incorporate the Chinese into their forces.  He persuaded the British that “Chinese instead 
of Malays [should] be raised into a Troop”, arguing that the Chinese were the “properest 
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people to be trusted”, where as it was likely that the “Malays or Mestezes… may go to 
the enemy with horse and arms.”109   
The Parián had traditionally had a degree of autonomy from the Spanish colonial 
Government in Manila.  When the British arrived they discovered that this Chinese 
community had its own Governor, mayors, guards, and other ministers and officials who 
traditionally oversaw the day-to-day running of the neighborhood.  These political leaders 
also traditionally managed relationships between the Chinese and the Spanish colonial 
government, including the collection and payment of the tribute or head tax that Manila’s 
Chinese residents were obliged to pay.110  O’Kennedy evidently had working 
relationships with leaders of the Parián and understood how this Chinese community was 
organized.  The Irishman’s knowledge and networks enabled him to negotiate with the 
Chinese on behalf of the British, facilitating the contracting of Chinese soldiers and other 
workers required to undertake the labor of occupation. 
O’Kennedy also organized for the Manila Council to purchase a range of goods 
from Chinese suppliers, including dried fish and sugar.111  The Manila Consultations 
indicate that O’Kennedy was paid 1077 silver dollars in December 1763 “for victualing 
the Spanish prisoners, and sundry other accounts.”112  It seems likely that O’Kennedy’s 
motivations for aiding the British were fundamentally economic.  The Irishman was a 
businessman who made large profits from the British occupation of Manila.  O’Kennedy 
was never punished for his disloyalty as he fled the city at the end of the British 
occupation.   
It is surprising that historians have been reluctant to acknowledge the presence of 
foreigners like Diego O’Kennedy in Manila.  The unlikely Irishman played an important 
role in sustaining the British occupation.  The presence of O’Kennedy and others like him 
compromised the integrity of Spanish Empire under the weight of invasion.  In the past 
decade historians have embraced the notion of the early-modern Atlantic World as an 
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especially fluid space were people, including subaltern subjects, moved between porous 
imperial boundaries with unexpected ease.  The Irishman’s presence in Manila challenges 
us to consider the extent to which mobility extended beyond the Atlantic into the 
Pacific.113 
The willingness of so many Chinese to cooperate with the British attests to the 
inability of missionaries to cement devotion in a population that did not in large numbers 
buy into the evangelical Catholic project of the Dominicans who oversaw the attempted 
conversion of this community.  In addition to their disloyalty to the King of Spain, the 
main reason that the Chinese were expelled from Manila after 1766 was their collective 
crime of apostacy - their abandonment or renunciation of their Catholic faith.  Chinese 
treason affirmed for the Council of the Indies that those Chinese who had sought baptism 
in the Philippines were false converts who ostensibly changed their religion to avoid 
earlier expulsions, and to enjoy ten years free from the obligation of tribute, a privilege 
applied to all New Christians in the Philippines.114 
Despite the important role that many Chinese—and intermediaries such as 
O’Kennedy—played in facilitating the British occupation of Manila, the Chinese were by 
no means all enemies of the Spanish.  Although Simon de Anda later championed the 
expulsion of the Chinese from the Philippines, throughout 1763 he refused to take their 
disloyalty to Spain as a given, even after the fall of Bulucan.  In May 1763 public notices 
signed by Anda in both Castilian and Chinese appeared in the neighbourhood of Santa 
Cruz.  These granted in the name if the Spanish King “a general pardon… for the lives of 
all such Chinese as still remain and had sided with the English”, on the condition that 
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they registered their presence, and refrained from taking up arms against Spaniards or 
assisting the invaders in any other way.115   
The Manila Consultations reveal that several Chinese and Chinese mestizos were 
active allies of Anda.  British assumptions of Chinese disloyalty to the Spanish Crown 
enabled them to be effective double-agents for the Governor-in-exile.  By mid-1763 
British captains began to realise that the “Chinese are employed as spies.”116  In July 
Captain Backhouse captured the “Chinese mestizo” Juan de la Cruz in possession of an 
incriminating commission signed by Don Josef Pedro del Busto, a prominent general in 
Simon de Anda’s army, and “list of soldiers… locked in his chest”.  De la Cruz had 
allegedly escorted to a village just outside of Manila a group of of ten or twelve Chinese 
who all had commissions from Anda “to act as Spies upon all occasions.” Cruz’s 
cooperation with the Spaniards cost him his life.  Backhouse insisted on “hanging this 
Villain, and every other Commissary that I can catch” in order to discourage other 
Chinese from working to undermine the British occupation of Manila.   
Of course Manila’s Chinese population did not have to choose between 
supporting the Spanish or supporting the British during the occupation.  Many Chinese 
attempted to take advantage of this situation without necessarily supporting either 
European power.  This is revealed by the fact that the tradition of Chinese doctoring 
specie throughout the long history of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines continued 
during the occupation.117  In December 1763 Captain Backhouse complained that the 
“greatest part of the small Spanish currency, double, single and half reals, is secreted and 
hoarded up in the Parian.”118  The Chinese were making significant profits from 
exchanging Spanish silver coins for Rupees at exchange rates the Captain deemed unfair.  
Backhouse also accused the Chinese of manufacturing “bad barillas, rupees or dollars” 
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which they passed on to soldiers and servants, but “refused to take again the moment 
after issued from their hands. This truth is very notorious.”119 
The British had in error assumed that the Chinese were exploited by the Spaniards 
and awaiting emancipation, like the Sultan of Sulu and his son.  An inability to trust the 
Chinese in Manila ultimately led the British to enforce a policy of Chinese segregation, 
as various Spanish colonial governments had done in the past.120  On 20 December 1763 
the Manila Council “signed a proclamation ordering all the inhabitants of Santa Cruz”, 
most of whom were Chinese and Chinese mestizos, to relocate to the Parián where they 
could be placed under surveillance.121  
 
  
                                                
119 Ibid.  
120 Santamaria, The Chinese Parian, 67-118. 
121 The Manhila Consultations 1763 Vol. 5, 232. 
 38 
CONCLUSION  
The British occupation of Manila in 1762-1764 was undoubtedly a crisis for 
Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines.  The British Royal Navy and East India 
Company abruptly ended 191 years of unbroken Spanish control of the Manila when their 
combined force captured the city in late 1762.  It is tempting to read the subsequent 
British occupation of Manila as indicative of Spain’s weak grasp on its distant Pacific 
possessions as many historians have done.  As this paper showed, Spain’s temporary loss 
of Manila created an unprecedented opportunity for a range of imperial subjects in the 
Philippines to contest Spanish authority.  Soldiers deserted from Spanish ranks, 
merchants in Manila collaborated with the invaders, and thousands of Indigenous 
peasants rose up in rebellion in the provinces north of Manila, demanding the abolition of 
the tribute system, and in Pangasinan, the expulsion of all Spaniards, including Spanish 
priests, from their lands.   
Yet despite these waves of disobedience, this paper has shown that if we probe 
beneath the surface of the past, the Spanish empire in the Philippines was remarkably 
strong under the pressures imposed by the British invasion and occupation of Manila.  By 
placing the rebel army of Simón de Anda under the metaphorical microscope for the first 
time, I have revealed that those subjects who historians assumed were fundamentally 
opposed to Spanish colonial rule, and willing to “throw off the Spanish yoke” when an 
opportunity like a foreign invasion arose, in fact mobilized en masse to support the 
preservation of the Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines. 
 The resilience of the Spanish empire in the Philippines in 1762-1764 was 
underscored by the willingness of thousands of indigenous people, the Pampangans in 
particular, to become soldiers in Anda’s army.  These loyal Indians united behind Anda 
to fight not only the British invaders, but also the rebellious Ilocanos and Pangasinans 
who they ultimately defeated.  The fidelity of so many indigenous people to Spain during 
the Seven Years War testifies to the role of Catholicism as a cohesive force among 
 39 
converted Indians.  This is confirmed by the absence of a strong Catholic faith among the 
numerous Chinese who collaborated with the British forces.  
 Loyalty to Spain in the occupied Philippines contradicts the ideology of the 
Black Legend that continues to warp the Anglo historiography of the British occupation 
of Manila.  Yet it is important to engage with and historicize this myth rather than erasing 
it from our interpretations of the past.  I have demonstrated that the Black Legend is not 
merely an invention of historians; this myth profoundly influenced the strategies of 
invasion and occupation that the British Royal Navy and East India Company put into 
action by in the Philippines.  Ultimately, the Black Legend blinded the British to the 
complexities of the real balance of power in the Pacific theatre of the Seven Years War. 
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